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DO WORKERS SHARE INNOVATION RETURNS?
A Study of the Spanish Manufacturing Sector
ESTER MARTÍNEZ-ROS AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS
ABSTRACT: This paper explores whether workers share innovation returns and how the size of innovation returns is
affected by market conditions. Using a panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period from 1990 to 1993,
we answer affirmatively to both questions. Product and process innovations both generate returns, but such returns are
higher for process innovations. The size of innovation returns seems to be affected positively by demand growth, by
product standardization, and by low product market concentration. The three empirical results are in agreement with the
theoretical predictions, such as Schmoockler’s (1966) theory of demand-pool innovation, the price-elasticity of demand
effects postulated by Kamien & Schwartz (1970), and the replacement effect suggested by Arrow (1962). At the time of
generating returns, process innovations are more affected by market conditions than are other innovations.
RESUMEN: Esta artículo investiga dos cuestiones: primero, si los trabajadores captan parte de las rentas derivadas de la
introducción de innovación en las empresas; segundo, si el tamaño de dichas rentas dependen de las características y
condiciones del mercado. El trabajo se realiza utilizando una muestra de empresas manufactureras españolas en el período
1990–1993. Los resultados apuntan que efectivamente los trabajadores captan rentas de innovación sobre todo cuando la
innovación que se introduce es en procesos de producción. Además, las características del mercado afectan el tamaño de las
rentas en la línea que plantean las diversas teorías contrastadas. Se confirman que el impulso de la demanda (Schmookler,
1966), el efecto de la elasticidad-precio (Kamien y Schwartz, 1970) y el efecto reemplazamiento (Arrow, 1962) constituyen
elementos a tener en cuenta en el estímulo de la actividad innovadora de las empresas.
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Innovation is a managerial issue that is influenced by charac-
teristics of the firm and by the firm’s environment. When a
firm engages in innovation activity, it is with the expectation
that its competitive advantage and market position will be
improved, leading to increased profits. If profits grow, work-
ers may or may not be offered the incentive of a share of the
extra rents generated.
This paper addresses two questions. Do workers capture a
share of the innovation returns or rents? And, if so, how is the
measurement of those rents and the evaluation of their deter-
minants affected? The empirical data for this study were ob-
tained from a survey of Spanish manufacturing firms, Encuesta
Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), which was conducted
by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology during
the period from 1990 to 1993.
There is empirical evidence that U.K. (Van Reenen, 1996)
and Spanish (Martínez-Ros, 1999) manufacturing firms that
engage in either product or process innovation pay higher
salaries than do noninnovating firms when factors such as size
of the firm and quality of the workforce are controlled. Conolly,
Hirsch, & Hirschey (1986) demonstrated in a sample of Ameri-
can firms that a strong union reduces the contribution of R&D
(research and development) investments to firm profits, which
was interpreted as evidence that the workers had acquired a
greater share of the rents gained through innovation.
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If workers capture part of the innovation returns in the
form of higher wages, the reported net profits of innovating
firms will obviously measure only part of the total innovation
returns. This is the phenomenon that we test in this study.
Thus, we needed a methodology that would properly esti-
mate the size of the net innovation returns.
The size of the innovation return is an important determi-
nant of the incentive to innovate. Firms will undertake inno-
vation activities if the expected revenues of such activities
provide an acceptable compensation or return on investment
for the resources dedicated to them. Therefore, if we are able
to isolate and measure the net benefits of innovation activi-
ties, and if we can relate them to characteristics of the firm
and of the market in which the firm operates, we can better
understand the determinants of the incentives to innovate.
Galende & Suárez González (1999) provide arguments that
support the role of intangible factors in determining the prob-
ability of conducting internal R&D. In fact, most of the pre-
vious literature has focused on the factors that determine the
resources that a particular firm dedicates to R&D activities.
If a firm dedicates increased resources to R&D, it is pre-
sumably because it expects to receive higher profits from the
new processes or products that will result from the innova-
tion activity. However, we believe that it is of interest to de-
termine (1) if R&D activities do in fact increase profitability,
(2) if the increase in profitability varies between product or
process innovation, (3) if there is a relation between the size
of innovation returns and such variables as the growth or con-
centration of the market, and (4) if this possible relation is
affected by the way the innovation returns are measured.
We believe that an adequate framework for the develop-
ment of the analysis must include two perspectives: competi-
tive strategy and a resource-based view. Porter’s treatment of
competitive strategy (1991) focuses on the role of a firm’s
activities and positioning as a fruitful venue for the develop-
ment of a dynamic theory of strategy. Hence, strategy is a
consistent array or configuration of activities aimed at creat-
ing one of two specific types of competitive advantage: differ-
entiation (product innovation) and low cost (innovation
process). Barney (1991) and Rumelt (1991), on the other hand,
present a resource-based view, a view that focuses on the rela-
tions between a firm’s internal characteristics and its perfor-
mance, and includes two assumptions: that firms are
heterogeneous in their resources and capabilities, and that these
resources and capabilities are not perfectly mobile across firms,
resulting in heterogeneity among industry participants. As
Spanos & Lioukas (2001) have pointed out, the competitive
strategy and the resource-based perspectives are complemen-
tary. Value creation stems from the fit of internal capabilities
to the strategy pursued and from the fit of the strategy to the
competitive environment.
The research design to test our empirical model employed
panel data techniques. Given the dynamic nature of the model,
we applied a new instrumental variables method to achieve
consistency in the estimation of the parameters and to im-
prove efficiency (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond,
1995). The estimation procedure accounts for the endogeneity
problem generated by the simultaneous determination of prof-
its and such explanatory variables as market share.
Our results show that innovation generates rents and that
firms therefore have economic incentives to pursue innovation
activities. We also find that process innovations generate greater
rents than do product innovations, and that controlling for the
proportion of the rents that are captured by the employees has
significant effects on the estimation of the size of such rents.
Finally, the empirical results show that innovation returns are
inversely related to the product market concentration, that is,
they are lower in more concentrated markets than in less con-
centrated ones. If less concentrated markets are also more com-
petitive, then innovation returns are higher in more competitive
markets. This result is consistent with the predictions of Ar-
row (1962), who postulated that firms in more competitive
markets are able to obtain greater rents from innovations be-
cause a high level of competition tends to create lower profits
before the innovation is introduced. Monopolists, on the other
hand, begin with higher profits, so the replacement effect
means that innovation has a lower incremental effect on them.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The decision to innovate is determined by the relation be-
tween the benefits and costs associated with such a decision.
In this section, we present an overview of the literature on
the determinants of innovation returns, in particular, the
relation between the rents and the type of innovation (prod-
uct or process) and the relation between innovation returns
and the product market (demand growth, product differen-
tiation, and market competition) and labor market condi-
tions. Baldwin & Scott (1987), Kamien & Schwartz (1982),
Levin, Cohen, & Mowery (1985), and Scherer (1980), report
on surveys of the two main factors—firm size and market
structure—that influence the level of R&D. Cohen and col-
leagues (Cohen, 1995; Cohen & Levin, 1989) are also excel-
lent sources on this subject. Cohen & Klepper (1996a, 1996b)
and Tether (1998) review the relation between firm size and
innovation propensity. Bughin & Jacques (1994) and Malerba
& Orsenigo (1996) emphasize the necessity of linking inno-
vation and market structure in order to understand mana-
gerial efficiency.
Innovating Rents
Innovation is a heterogeneous activity. According to
Schumpeter (1942), innovation can be associated with the
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introduction of a new product or service, or with improve-
ments or changes in the production process, materials, and
intermediate inputs; innovation is also associated with man-
agement methods. Some of these activities may be related,
such as when the introduction of new products and the use of
new designs (innovation in products) accompany improve-
ments in the procedures used to manufacture products (inno-
vation in process). We are interested in the factors that explain
why companies engage in product innovation and/or process
innovation. As Milgrom & Roberts (1990) point out, product
and process innovation activities are mutually reinforcing: An
increase in the level of one leads to an increase in the marginal
profitability of the other, and vice versa. Except for a brief
description, however, this issue is beyond the scope of this
investigation.
Some empirical observations of behavior in firms have led
to the conclusion that firms choose strategically between the
two innovation alternatives of product versus process, usually
avoiding a complete specialization in one. Pine, Victor, &
Boyton (1993), however, have demonstrated that firms struc-
ture their organization to allow for engagement in both types
of innovation. The literature provides scarce evidence on the
relations between product and process innovations. Giacomo
& Haworth (1998), Kraft (1990), and Lunn (1986), have in-
troduced the possibility that innovation could be divided into
different categories, depending on its final purpose.
More recent articles (Flaig & Stadler, 1998; Fritsch &
Meschede, 2001) have demonstrated that product and pro-
cess innovation are related. Implementation of a product in-
novation can render corresponding process innovation
necessary, whereas process innovation may enable a firm to
improve the quality of its products significantly or to pro-
duce completely new products. Bonano & Haworth (1998)
considered a vertically differentiated industry and a firm’s de-
cision to choose either product or process innovation under
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Rosenkranz (2003) ana-
lyzed simultaneous product and process innovations in a situ-
ation in which demand is characterized by a preference for
product variety. After investigating the strategic decisions of
two identical duopolists that choose production technology
as well as product differentiation through R&D investment,
Rosenkranz concluded that a firm’s investment is driven to
product innovation if the consumer’s willingness to pay is
high. An attempt was made in these studies to expand the
literature on the most profitable direction for R&D—toward
product innovation or process innovation—while controlling
for the degree of market competition faced by the firm.
In general, process innovations are aimed at introducing
technological advances, which reduce production costs, and
eventually help the innovating firm to gain a market share
from its competitors. Product innovations, on the other hand,
expand the set of production opportunities, and in some cases,
allow for gains in efficiency due to scope economies. If inno-
vation activity results in a greater degree of product differen-
tiation, the innovating firm may face a lowered price elasticity
of demand, and consequently, increased profit margins. Prod-
uct and process innovations often occur in parallel, producing
a complementary effect: A product innovation may require a
process innovation, for example, to accommodate a new prod-
uct design or a change in a product characteristic.
It is more difficult to determine differences between the
size of innovation returns attributed to one type of innova-
tion versus those attributed to another. It may be argued that
product innovations will be easier to imitate because com-
petitors will immediately become aware of them and patent
law may not be able to protect the property rights of the in-
novator effectively. On the other hand, since the innovating
firm does not exteriorize process innovations, it may take ri-
val firms a considerable amount of time to discover the origin
of a particular competitive advantage. All these factors may
suggest that the rents of process innovations will tend to be
higher than the rents of product innovations, assuming the
same degree of “innovativeness.”
Market Conditions
The size of innovation returns will be affected not only by the
nature of the innovation, but also by the conditions of the
market in which the innovating firm operates. Among those
conditions, the degree of firm rivalry or market competition
is particularly emphasized in the literature. Market condi-
tions involve the familiar Schumpeterian hypotheses about
the extent to which firm size and competition in the industry
environment stimulate innovation. It is sometimes claimed
that innovation is fostered by a climate in which firms have
market power or in industries with less competition.
Market structure is viewed as a key determinant of the
sustainable performance of firms. Typically, industrial orga-
nization studies have approached the degree of competition by
assessing market concentration (Cohen & Levin [1989] give a
complete overview of the relation between R&D and concen-
tration, and provide an extensive discussion of the ambiguous
predictions obtained in empirical studies). In general, the
empirical evidence supports Schumpeter’s arguments that
firms in concentrated markets can more easily appropriate
the returns from inventive activity. The Schumpeterian view
of innovation argues that monopolistic power will foster in-
novation activity. According to this viewpoint, innovation
returns will be substantial for the monopolistic firm, and will
persist over time as barriers to other firms trying to enter the
market limit imitation. A firm with market power and a
monopolistic position will be subject to an “efficiency effect,”
in the sense that innovation will be perceived as the only way
to protect its privileged position in the market. A potential
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entrant, on the other hand, will anticipate a lower compensa-
tion for its innovation activities because, after entry, a com-
petitive battle will take place with the incumbent monopolist
(Gilbert & Newberry, 1982).
Other investigators have found evidence that market con-
centration does not promote R&D. Indeed, they suggest that
the higher the degree of competitiveness, the larger the ex-
pected incremental rents from the innovation activity will be
(Arrow, 1962; Bozeman & Link, 1983; Delbono & Denicolo,
1990; Yi, 1999). This opposite view of the relation between
market competition and innovation returns illustrates the so-
called replacement effect (Arrow, 1962). If we start with a
competitive market in which price equals cost and profits are
zero, then if innovation is sufficiently important to give mar-
ket power to the innovating firm, the new equilibrium price
should be higher and the innovator’s cost and profits will in-
crease substantially. On the other hand, if the market is non-
competitive, a situation in which prices are above costs and
firms earn positive profits, an innovation will increase prof-
its, but to a lesser degree, because current firms are already
making positive profits. In this case, an innovating monopo-
list will end up replacing itself, whereas when the market is
competitive, innovation may change the market structure
toward a monopoly, with the resultant substantial increase in
profits. All this implies that innovations should produce higher
rents for firms operating in more competitive markets be-
cause initial profits in such markets are expected to be lower.
The relation between market competition and innovation
returns is, therefore, an empirical question. Although Arrow
(1962) made a claim contrary to Schumpeter (1942), there is
mixed evidence that either position is accurate (Scherer, 1992).
Because of its importance, this issue continues to be researched
using U.S. (Cohen & Klepper, 1996a, 1996b) and Spanish
data (Martínez-Ros & Labeaga, 2002).
Some auxiliary hypotheses have been formulated to guide
the empirical research. For example, Kamien & Schwartz (1970)
show that under the replacement effect assumption, innova-
tion returns will increase with the absolute value of the price
elasticity of demand, that is, they will be higher for firms fac-
ing more elastic demand functions. One reason a firm might
face a more elastic demand curve is that there are more substi-
tutes in the market, that the market itself is more competitive.
Kamien & Schwartz’s analysis assumes a process innova-
tion that lowers production costs. If the cost reduction is trans-
lated into lower prices, the size of the market served will
expand more, as the demand function is also more price-
elastic. This phenomenon will, in turn, determine a positive
association between innovation returns and price elasticity of
demand. As Spence (1975) has shown, however, when the in-
novation is in a product but not in a process, improvements
in product quality will produce higher innovation returns in
markets with more inelastic demands because they will allow
for higher margins. Therefore, the relation between innova-
tion returns and price elasticity of demand may be sensitive
to the type of innovation being considered.
Another market characteristic that we want to consider is
demand growth. Schmookler (1966) argues that growth in
market demand is the primary force behind technological
change. Walsh (1984) elaborates on this idea, and highlights
the fact that innovation activity requires a high investment
cost that does not depend on the demand of the product once
the innovation is made. Given the indivisibility of the inno-
vation costs and investments, innovating rents will depend
largely on the size and growth of the market for the final
products for both product and process innovations.
Labor Market Conditions
The innovation returns distribution. Thus far, our attention
has focused on the generation of innovating rents. For
methodological reasons, we now turn to the important
consideration of the distribution of rents. The innovation
process will contribute to improvements in products and
processes that will, in turn, increase the value added by
conventional inputs such as labor and physical capital.
Therefore, innovation should contribute to improvements in
total factor productivity. Productivity gains will, in turn, be
distributed in the form of higher profits, higher wages, or
both. When labor markets are competitive, the productivity
gains from innovation will be revealed in higher profits.
Consequently, the measurement and evaluation of innovation
returns can be made either from total factor productivity gains
or from increases in profitability. But when workers have
bargaining power and capture part of the productivity gains
in the form of higher wages, innovation returns are no longer
equal to increments in profitability.
As we have indicated, there is empirical evidence of a posi-
tive association between salaries and innovations, although it
has been explained in different ways. For example, Bartel &
Lichtenberg (1990) and Bound & Johnson (1992) argue that
higher wages are the result of complementarities between
innovation activity and human capital, as there are higher
quality human resources in innovating as compared with nonin-
novating firms. The workers in the innovating firms earn higher
wages because they are more productive.
Other researchers believe that workers in innovating firms
earn higher wages because their bargaining power gives them
the power to capture part of the rents resulting from innova-
tion activities. In an early paper, Conolly et al. (1986) found
that when workers are organized into trade unions, firms earn
lower profits than is the case in nonunionized firms. More-
over, the presence of unionized workers tends to lower the
contribution of R&D expenditures to the firm’s profits. The
final result is that unionized firms invest less in R&D than do
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nonunionized firms. The authors conclude that the capture of
innovation returns by the workers turns out to be a negative
factor for dynamic efficiency. Other studies associate the cap-
ture of rents by workers with the extra profits obtained by
firms with higher market power (Clark, 1984; Salinger, 1984).
However, Hirsch (1990) finds no empirical evidence that this
capture of rents emanates from the market power of the firm.
Hildreth & Oswald (1997) have reviewed the literature on
this subject, showing evidence for some ability-to-pay effect
on wages in the U.K. Looking ate Spanish firms, Andrés &
García (1991) and Jaumandreu & Martínez-Ros (1995) arrive
at different conclusions regarding the determinants of wage
differentials by demonstrating that market power, profitabil-
ity, export propensity, or market share are relevant variables
in the determination of wage differentials.
More recently, however, Menezes-Filho, Ulph, & Van
Reenen (1998) found no empirical support in a sample of U.K.
firms for the hypothesis that unionization affects the level of
R&D effort. Finally, Martínez-Ros & Salas (1999) have ob-
tained evidence that innovating firms pay higher salaries, and
that higher salaries, in turn, seem to have a positive effect on
innovation activity. The authors interpret this result in terms
of the premise of the “mutual gains” enterprise as postulated
by Kochan & Osterman (1994).
The model. The exposition above may be represented by a model
that will be helpful in the specification of the empirical equations.
Define the rents of the firm i in a period t as
cc
it it it it it it it QR p Q w L r K , =−−                                   (1)
where pit is the price, Qit is the output, wc
it is the competitive
salary, Lit is the number of employees, rc
it is the market cost
of capital, and Kit is the physical capital. QRit includes eco-
nomic profits plus the costs of the innovation activities that
are considered sunk costs. Assuming that the costs of innova-
tion are sunk allows us to talk about rents instead of rents of
innovation.
The rents per unit of monetary output, QRit/pitQit, are as-
sumed to be a function of the innovation activity, Iit, and of









For each firm and time period, only accounting profits are
observed. It is therefore important to link Π(Iit, Mit) with
such profits. Define gross profit margin as
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where wit are salaries actually paid. It can be easily shown that
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In other words, gross profit margin from accounting prof-
its will be equal to rents plus the costs of physical capital,
minus the differences between labor costs at actual and at
competitive salaries, all of them normalized by the monetary
value of the firm’s output.
Product market conditions, Mit, will affect both economic
profits and the rents of innovation. Our underlying assump-
tion is that firms compete in an oligopolistic market with
product differentiation. Efficiency in production across firms
will determine part of their respective competitive advantages,
while market concentration and demand growth may affect
the opportunities for collusive behavior. On the other hand,
product market conditions are expected to affect the size of
the innovation returns. This may be summarized as follows:
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where the particular sign of the cross-derivative is determined
by the theoretical predictions outlined above. From
Schmoockler’s predictions, for example, we expect that the cross-
derivative between innovation rents and demand growth will
be positive.
The determinants of wages. The underlying model to
explain the actual wages, wit, is taken from Layard, Nickell, &
Jackman (1991). The authors consider that wages of firm i in
period t are determined by a Nash bargaining solution between
workers and the firm, which has previously invested in specific
assets, such as those required to create new products or new
processes. Part of the rents correspond to these investments,
but it is possible that workers capture rents from other sources,
such as those resulting from market power and/or resulting
from more efficient work practices.
The reduced form of the model is as follows:
() it it it it wF,  I ,  X =ω . (6)
Where wit is the observed wage of firm i in period t, ωit is a
proxy of the workers’ opportunity wage, Iit is the innovation
variable defined above, and Xit is a vector of control variables










that is, firms that innovate, ceteris paribus, pay higher wages.
Notice that, contrary to previous work, we directly mea-
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sure the innovation returns captured by workers. In other
works, we test whether workers in innovating firms do in fact
earn higher salaries, where innovation is measured in terms of
output, not of input (R&D expenditures, for example). In this
way, we avoid indirect measures of workers’ bargaining power,
such as whether they are unionized.
 RESEARCH DESIGN
The Empirical Model and Methodology
Wage equation. The wage equation defined above will be
explicitly stated as
(8)
tion to avoid estimation biases. One way to solve this prob-
lem is to transform the variables into differences and to use
these differences in t − 2 values of the dependent variables as
valid instruments of the variable in t − 1 (Anderson & Hsiao,
1982; Arellano & Bond, 1991).
A more recently developed solution to this measurement
issue is presented by Arellano & Bover (1995), who measure
the lagged variable, mit, with ∆mit−1, thereby increasing the
efficiency of the estimation, and given that there is no serial
correlation in the error term, ensuring that the estimated co-
efficients are consistent estimators. The estimation procedure
also accounts for the fact that market share will be endog-
enous and jointly determined with profit margins; for this
reason, market share is measured by its lagged value (Geroski,
Machin, & Van Reenen, 1993).
Measurement of Variables
In the wage equation, we construct the variables as follows.
The dependent variable WAGES is measured by dividing the
labor expenses of firm i in year t by the total number of work-
ers of the firm; we also include WAGES lagged one year. The
industry average wage, AVGWAGE, is obtained by dividing
the total labor expenses of the firms in the industry (disag-
gregated at the two-digit level)1 by the total number of workers
in those firms. Market share, SHARE, is the ratio of the sales
of firm i in year t to the industry sales, also in year t. The
quality of the labor force is measured by two variables: HIGH
SKILLED is the proportion of workers with university de-
grees in firm i in period t, and MEDIUM SKILLED is the
proportion of workers with high school degrees in firm i in
period t. Finally, Xit contains time and industry dummies.
In the profit margin equation, the dependent variable,
PROFIT, is measured as the percentage of gross margin over
total value of production for firm i in period t. Gross margin
is equal to the value of production, minus cost of inputs from
other firms, minus labor costs; the value of production is equal
to sales plus changes in inventories. The regression includes
the lagged values for gross profit margin among the explana-
tory variables to capture the time-varying effects that are fur-
thest away from the equilibrium solution.2 For example,
lagged profit margins could capture the influence of cash flows
attached to profitability on innovation activity, as greater or
lesser cash flow implies more or less funds available to finance
innovation activities.
In this line of research, one important methodological is-
sue is how to approximate innovation activity. Most often,
input measures such as R&D effort (expenditures in R&D
relative to value added, and number of workers in R&D ac-
tivities relative to total number of workers) are selected. How-
ever, it takes time for R&D inputs to generate outputs such as
new products, patents, and process improvements. Moreover,
wwI X v it o it
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where i refers to the firm, j to the type of innovation (prod-
uct, process, or both), and t to the time period. The variable
wit indicates the average wage paid by firm i in period t; ωt is
the average wage in the industry in which firm i belongs in
period t; Iijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the firm i innovates in period t, and takes the value of 0 oth-
erwise (where j = 1, 2, or 3 for product, process, or both); Xit
is a vector of control variables, which accounts for the quality
of the labor force, the market share of the firm, and the pos-
sible industry effects beyond the industry’s average wage.
Profit margin equation. To evaluate the innovation returns,
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where mit is the gross profit margin; mit-1 is the lagged gross
profit margin; Iit is the set of innovation variables; Mit is the set
of proxy variables for market and efficiency conditions; Iit * Nit
is the interaction between innovation and a subset, Nit, of the
market conditions variables; KSAit is the ratio of physical capi-
tal to sales; Zit is the set of variables measuring the innovation
returns appropriated by the workers; Yit is a set of other con-
trol variables; and εit is the error term. In the following para-
graphs, we explain the construction of each of the variables.
The error term, εit, includes unobservable firm-specific ef-
fects, µi, and random-time varying effects, vit, that is,
εit = µ i + vit. The firm-specific effects may be justified by the
fact that the managerial choice of the strategy for a particular
firm will be related to the sources of profits in the past. The
error term εit will be correlated with the lagged dependent
variable because of the fixed-time invariant effect, µi, and the
econometric estimation will have to account for this correla-
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because they are often treated in the short run as current ex-
penditures by the firms, there may be a negative association
between R&D effort and accounting profits. As Kamien &
Schwartz (1982) have pointed out, in this case the R&D is
measured as a cost rather than as an investment, and one might
expect to find an inverse relation.
Innovation activity is measured in terms of output flow.
This measure is preferred over other variables often used as
inputs to the innovation activity, such as R&D expenditures
or R&D personnel, because innovation output is not always
the result of formal innovation processes.3 Innovation counts
are also preferred over other measures of output, such as num-
ber of patents, as there are many innovations that are not pat-
ented by the firms. Townsend, Hendwood, Thomas, Pavitt,
& Wyatt (1981), Pavitt, Robson, & Townsend (1987), Robson,
Townsend, & Pavitt (1988), and, more recently, Blundell,
Griffith, & Van Reenen (1995), use the number of innova-
tions developed by the firms as their output measure. The
main problem in using this indicator is the difficulty in iden-
tifying the significant innovations because of the numerous
biases of waste heterogeneity in the economic value of inno-
vations. On the other hand, patent counts (Bound, Cummins,
Griliches, Hall, & Jaffe, 1984; Griliches, 1990; Scherer, 1965)
cause problems in comparisons within and between indus-
tries because they are heterogeneous in economic value as
well.
The choice of an output, such as a number flow, instead of
a stock measure of knowledge, has been imposed by data limi-
tations. To obtain a more accurate measure of the knowledge
base, it would have been desirable to measure whether or not
the firm reports innovations in product, process, or both; its
actual number of innovations; and, ideally, the economic value
of the innovations. Unfortunately, we were only able to ob-
tain data for the number of innovations in the case of product
innovations.
The variables for innovation activity, Iit, are measured in
terms of three dummy variables: PRODUCT, PROCESS, and
BOTH. The variable PRODUCT (or PROCESS or BOTH)
takes the value of 1 when the firm i indicates that in period t,
a product (or process, or both) innovation has occurred, and a
value of 0 when there is no such innovation. These measures
have limitations, because it is not possible to measure the
importance of the innovation. Nevertheless, we include all
the innovations recognized by the firms.
If innovation activities generate rents, a positive value of
the vector β is expected. Moreover, the size of the β1 coeffi-
cient for the variables PRODUCT, PROCESS, and BOTH,
will indicate whether or not innovation returns differ for each
type of innovation.
The model includes two main variables to account for firm
heterogeneity in terms of productive efficiency and market com-
petition. The first is market share, SHARE, and the second is
industry concentration, CONCENTRATION. More efficient
firms will capture higher market shares; therefore, ex post dif-
ferences in market share may serve as good proxies of differ-
ences in efficiency across firms. Since collusion tends to be
easier in more concentrated markets, we would expect that
firms in more concentrated markets will earn higher profits.
However, if differences in efficiency across firms in the mar-
ket are important, a more concentrated market will be the
result of differences in efficiency and market share across firms
rather than evidence of collusive practices. One way to isolate
the efficiency or collusion effects of concentration on profits
is to incorporate into the regression the product of market
share and concentration, SHACONC. With this in mind, the
vector Mit will include three variables: SHARE, CONCEN-
TRATION, and SHACONC.
The variable SHARE is measured as the ratio of sales of
firm i in period t over total industry sales (at the two-digit
level) in the same period. CONCENTRATION, on the other
hand, is measured as the sum of percentages of sales shares of
the four largest firms in the industry in each period t. Assum-
ing that differences in concentration across industries respond
to efficiency effects, we expect that the coefficient of SHACONC
will be negative. On the other hand, a positive coefficient for
the interactive variable could be an indication that concen-
tration facilitates collusion, and that it is collusion that ex-
plains why profits are higher in more concentrated markets.
The innovation variables, PRODUCT, PROCESS, and
BOTH, are viewed as interacting with proxies for market con-
ditions such as growth, elasticity of demand, and competi-
tion. Firms in the ESEE database indicate whether their
products are sold in a recessive market. Using this informa-
tion, we defined the dummy variable DEMAND, which takes
the value of 1 if the firm responds affirmatively to the ques-
tion about recessive markets, and 0 if it does not. According
to the theory outlined in the “Theoretical Framework” sec-
tion above, innovation returns are lower in markets with low
demand growth, and consequently, we expected the coeffi-
cient of the interactive variables DEMPROD (DEMAND *
PRODUCT), DEMPROC (DEMAND * PROCESS), and
DEMBOTH (DEMAND * BOTH) to be negative.
Price elasticity of demand is not directly observed, but the
database informs us about the characteristics of the products
sold by the firms. In particular, firms collaborating with the
ESEE survey that produced the data for our study indicate
whether or not their products are standardized. Accordingly,
the dummy variable HOMOGENEOUS takes the value of 1
when the firm’s products are standardized, and 0 when they
are not. The underlying assumption is that standardized
products face a more elastic demand, and according to the
theory, the interaction variable HOMOPROC should have
a positive coefficient in the regression (higher innovation
returns for process innovations). On the other hand, if prod-
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uct innovations imply improvements in product quality, the
innovation could contribute to differentiation of the prod-
uct and to increased profit margins. But it is also true that
profit margins for standardized products will tend to be lower
to begin with, so quality improvements to them will tend
to yield lower incremental profits. This implies that the co-
efficients of HOMOPROD and HOMOBOTH will have an
ambiguous sign.
The third market characteristic that may affect the size of
the innovation returns is intensity of product market compe-
tition. Market competition is approximated by market con-
centration in an inverse way. With this is mind, the variables
PRODCONC, PROCCONC, and BOTHCONC are con-
structed. Their coefficients will indicate whether or not mar-
ket concentration affects the size of innovation rents. A positive
value of such coefficients would be consistent with the “effi-
ciency effect,” in the sense that firms in more concentrated
markets tend to capture more rents because there is less imi-
tation. On the other hand, a negative coefficient would be
consistent with the “replacement effect.”
The variable, CAPITAL, is defined as the ratio of the mon-
etary value of physical capital (total assets at replacement cost)
to the monetary value of production of the firm i in period t.
We expect the coefficient β4 to be positive, according to the
theoretical model (Equation 4).
According to Equation 4, the variable that measures the
part of the profit margin that is transferred to the workers of
the innovating firm is
(wit – wc
it) Lit/pitQit. (10)
The estimation of the wage in Equation 8 provides esti-
mates of the average value of wage rents (wit − wc
it) across firms
and each type of innovation, α2j, j = 1, 2, 3. The vector α2 is
then multiplied by the matrix (PRODUCT, PROCESS,
BOTH). Therefore, we assume that workers capture the same
amount of rents for each type of innovation in all firms. Fi-
nally, the resulting values are divided by the inverse of labor
productivity (sales per worker); the variables PRODUCT
RETURNS, PROCESS RETURNS, BOTH RETURNS ob-
tained in this process are the empirical constructs used to ap-
proximate the theoretical variable that measures the rents
captured by the workers. The model includes the export ac-
tivity of the firm as a control variable, EXPORT. Export ac-
tivity is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the
firm exports, and 0 if it does not export.
Results
The data used to estimate the empirical model and to test the
hypotheses outlined above are derived from the ESEE survey
and cover the period from 1990 to 1993. We used a balanced
panel of the data consisting of 973 firms at four time periods.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent and
explanatory variables for the entire sample and for two
subsamples, each selected by accounting for the innovation ac-
tivity of each firm over time. We selected the data in the col-
umn headed “Output in R&D” using an indicator of innovation
(measuring whether product or process innovation is conducted).
The column under the heading “Input of R&D,” includes all
observations with positive R&D expenditures. Obviously, the
sample size for these two columns is different because not all
firms investing in R&D have successful innovation output. In
fact, we observe that only 65 percent of the innovating firms
get results, thereby confirming the idea that not all investment
in R&D directly results in technological advances.
We performed the estimation of innovation returns in two
steps. First, we measured the size of innovation returns, and
second we investigated their relation with market character-
istics. Table 2 provides the results of estimating the wage
Equation 8. The coefficients of PRODUCT, PROCESS, and
BOTH are all positive and statistically significant. We there-
fore have evidence that workers in innovating firms earn higher
wages than do workers in noninnovating firms. The differ-
ence increases from 4 percent higher wages in the case of pro-
cess innovations to 7 percent higher in the case of firms that
innovate in processes and products.
Tables 3 and 4 present estimates of the effect of innova-
tions on profits and the relation between profits and market
conditions, respectively. As the first column of Table 3 shows,
all the explanatory variables not related to innovation activ-
ity have statistically significant coefficients. Notably, all these
coefficients are positive, except the one for the interactive vari-
able SHACONC, which is negative. This means that the firms’
profits are sensitive to both market characteristics and firm
characteristics. The coefficient of the lagged dependent vari-
ables is .229, which is highly significant; therefore, the short-
run effects of the explanatory variables on profit margins are
approximately one-fifth of their long-run effects. Profit mar-
gins are positively associated with market share and market
concentration; the negative coefficient of the interactive vari-
able indicates that market share and market concentration
are related to profits through the efficiency effect. Engaging
in export has positive effects on profits. The positive coeffi-
cient of CAPITAL indicates that part of the gross profit mar-
gins goes to pay a competitive return to capital.
Column 2 in Table 3 shows the same results after the inno-
vation variables have been included in the regression. The
coefficients of the innovation variables are, as expected, posi-
tive and highly significant. The coefficients of the remainder
of the explanatory variables are slightly reduced, but all re-
main statistically significant except the coefficient for the
variable that measures market share. The effect of both types
of innovation on rents is not homogenous. At only a .14 level
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
Output of Input of
All firms, R&D, R&D,
Variable Definition mean (SD) mean (SD)b mean (SD)c
PROFIT Added value, minus cost of production, divided 0.108 0.107 0.104
by total production (0.143) (0.135) (0.142)
SHARE Total firm sales divided by two-digit industry 0.035 0.053 0.073
total sales of the sample (0.125) (0.164) (0.184)
CONCENTRATION  Four-firm, two-digit industry concentration ratio by sales 0.215 0.233 0.233
(0.204) (0.211) (0.202)
EXPORT  Dummy equals one if firm exports 0.544 0.707 0.844
(0.498) (0.455) (0.363)
CAPITAL  Capital divided by total firm sales 6.177 2.734 1.328
(27.48) (11.07) (7.432)
Knowledge capital
   PRODUCT Dummy equals one if firm conducts only product innovation 0.096 0.236 0.138
(0.294) (0.425) (0.345)
   PROCESS Dummy equals one if firm conducts only process innovation 0.151 0.372 0.186
(0.358) (0.484) (0.390)
   BOTH Dummy equals one if firm carries out both product and 0.159 0.392 0.325
process innovation (0.366) (0.488) (0.469)
Workers’ rentsa Rents obtained by the introduction of innovations:
PRODUCT RETURNS Only in product 0.057 0.141 0.069
(0.216) (0.321) (0.204)
PROCESS RETURNS Only in process 0.065 0.160 0.067
(0.212) (0.309) (0.168)
BOTH RETURNS In both product and process simultaneously 0.097 0.240 0.181
(0.265) (0.373) (0.315)
Number of observations 3,892 1,580 1,442
a Variables constructed using wage equation.
b Innovating firms were selected if they had developed some innovation during the period independent of the innovation type.
c Innovating firms were selected using technological effort as the indicator.
TABLE 2







HIGH SKILLED 1.070 (1.60)
MEDIUM SKILLED 0.427 (1.62)
AVGWAGE 0.149 (0.926)
Note: Includes time and industrial dummies.
of significance, we reject the null hypothesis βprod = βproc.4
The last column of Table 3 introduces into the estimation
the variables that account for the fact that part of the innova-
tion returns go to the workers by way of higher wages. The
coefficients of these variables are negative and statistically sig-
nificant, as predicted by the theoretical model. But the most
important result is that the coefficients of the innovation vari-
ables displayed in column 3 are almost twice the values com-
pared with column 2. When we control for the rents captured
by workers, differences in profit margins attributed to differ-
ences in innovation output are equivalent to the effect of in-
novation in total factor productivity. The results show that
innovation returns, as measured by total factor productivity,
are substantially higher than those associated with differences
in profit margins (column 2).
The final step in the estimation of the model is to deter-
mine if the size of the innovation returns is sensitive to char-
acteristics of the product market. Table 4 shows the result of
estimating the model with the interactive variables Iit * Nit
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among the explanatory ones. As expected, innovation returns
are lower for firms selling products in recessive markets than
for firms operating in nonrecessive markets (Table 4, column
1). This is especially true for process innovation and for prod-
uct and process innovations together. The coefficient of
DEMPROD is not statistically significant.
Product standardization affects only the size of innovation
returns, with respect to the rents of nonstandardized (i.e., dif-
ferentiated) products, for joint product and process innova-
tion situations. The positive coefficient indicates that joint
product and process innovations generate more rents when
products are standardized than when they are not. Market
concentration affects the size of innovation returns in a nega-
tive and statistically significant way (Table 4, column 3).5
This effect is especially strong for process innovations and for
both product and process innovations. The last column of Table
4 shows the estimated coefficients of the model when all the
variables are included. Collinearity effects are more severe here,
but the basic results obtained step by step are maintained.
DISCUSSION
The essential finding of this research confirms the postulation
that firm-specific effects and industry effects condition the de-
termination of profits and, therefore, the effects of workers’ rents.
In combination, the two theoretical perspectives mentioned in
the introduction to this paper produce a good explanation for
the heterogeneity of firm performance. Our analysis uses this
framework to explain the behavior of Spanish companies.
We addressed two main questions in this paper: Do inno-
vations generate rents for workers and are the size of rents
affected by market conditions? The answer to both questions
is yes. Product innovations, process innovations, and both types
of innovations generate rents, and such rents appear to be
higher for process innovations. The significance of the three
technical variables included in our study confirms the hy-
pothesis that there is no homogenous innovation activity, a
position that accords with Kamien & Schwartz (1982), Lunn
(1986), and Kraft (1990), among others.
The size of innovation returns seems to be affected posi-
tively by demand growth, product standardization, and by
low product market concentration. Therefore, product inno-
vation seems to be equally effective in generating rents in
growing and in nongrowing markets. As indicated above,
product standardization implies, ceteris paribus, higher price
elasticity of demand. Either type of innovation alone does not
appear to be sufficient to affect rents differently from
nonstandarized products. When both innovations occur together,
however, the opportunity to lower price and expand demand (from
process innovation), and the opportunity to soften competi-
tion and improve the product (from product innovation), pro-
duce higher innovation returns in firms with standardized
products than in firms with nonstandardized products. As higher
concentration is associated with lower competition, the em-
pirical evidence is in favor of the replacement effect: Innova-
tion returns are higher in more competitive markets because
firms start with lower profits before the innovation takes place.
The three empirical results are in agreement with theo-
retical predictions, such as Schmoockler’s theory of demand-
pool innovation, the price elasticity of demand effects
suggested by Kamien & Schwartz (1970), and the replace-
ment effect postulated by Arrow (1962). The effect of market
conditions at the time of generating rents is stronger for pro-
cess innovations than for product innovations.
TABLE 3
Profit Margins and Innovations
Variables (1) (2) (3)
PROFITt – 1 0.229 (4.04) 0.232 (4.19) 0.228 (4.10)
SHARE 0.346 (1.93) 0.311 (1.76) 0.280 (1.58)
CONCENTRATION 0.092 (6.01) 0.076 (5.06) 0.077 (5.11)
SHACONC –1.055 (2.53) –0.987 (2.41) –0.947 (2.27)
EXPORT 0.034 (4.72) 0.020 (2.78) 0.018 (2.52)
CAPITAL * 10 0.002 (2.10) 0.002 (2.18) 0.002 (2.40)
PRODUCT 0.030 (3.40) 0.050 (3.35)
PROCESS 0.040 (4.52) 0.063 (4.20)
BOTH 0.032 (3.68) 0.058 (3.46)
PRODUCT RETURNS –0.031 (1.47)
PROCESS RETURNS –0.055 (1.58)
BOTH RETURNS –0.041 (1.53)
Wald testa 38.19 (3) 26.71 (3) 27.57 (3)
Sample size 1,946 1,946 1,946
Notes: t statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions pass the hypothesis of joint significance of regressors using the Wald test.
a The Wald test is different in each specification: In (1) it refers to CONCENTRATION, SHARE, and SHACONC; in (2) and (3) it refers to innovation
variables.
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The empirical results in this paper are obtained from a panel
data of Spanish manufacturing firms during the period from
1990 to 1993. The econometric estimation has controlled for
long-run effects and has corrected for endogeneity problems as
well as for the correlation between explanatory variables and
the error term. There are other important methodological con-
siderations in this paper: Innovation activity has been measured
in terms of output, and the estimation of the size of innovation
returns has accounted for the distribution of such rents between
higher wages and higher profits. This means that the final esti-
mation of innovation returns is a measure of the contribution
of innovation to total factor productivity. From another per-
spective, our results highlight the biases that may be incurred
if innovation returns are measured only in terms of differences
in the profitability of firms.
The results of this paper have important implications. First,
the fact that innovation generates rents raises the question of
why some firms innovate and others do not. We cannot an-
swer this question with these data, because the costs of inno-
vation are treated as sunk costs and are not incorporated into
the analysis. Therefore, for some firms, the expected rents ex
post may not be sufficient to cover the costs ex ante, and a
decision is made not to conduct formal and costly innovation
activities. One possible extension of the paper would be to
investigate whether the conditions that favor higher rents ex
post are also the conditions that tend to induce higher invest-
ment of resources in innovation activity ex ante.
Implications for Managers
The evidence that innovation returns are partially captured by
the firm’s workers in the form of higher wages may, in prin-
ciple, be a discouragement to investing resources in innovation
activity, given that the workers do not pay for such investments.
But the higher wages may be an incentive for workers to par-
ticipate actively in incremental innovations (such as those that
are part of total quality management practices). If this were the
case, higher wages would be a way of stimulating innovations
and, ex post, innovation activity may be even higher than when
workers do not share in the innovation gains. Analyzing the
relation between innovation activity and the share of innova-
tion returns should prove to be another fruitful area of research.
Our results show that for firms that operate in recessive
markets, product innovations may be more effective in gener-
ating rents than are process innovations. Therefore, the inno-
vation strategy of a particular firm should be designed by
accounting for market conditions such as demand growth.
The same recommendation can be made for firms that pro-
TABLE 4
Innovation Returns and Market Conditions
Variables Demand growth Product standard Market competition All effects jointly
PROFITt–1 0.246 (4.37) 0.249 (4.46) 0.230 (4.20) 0.244 (4.32)
SHARE 0.290 (1.56) 0.265 (1.40) 0.219 (1.25) 0.275 (1.50)
CONCENTRATION 0.073 (4.74) 0.072 (4.61) 0.105 (5.82) 0.073 (4.77)
SHACONC –0.950 (2.17) –0.927 (1.99) –0.774 (1.90) –0.880 (2.11)
EXPORT 0.016 (2.14) 0.016 (2.23) 0.013 (1.83) 0.016 (2.21)
CAPITAL * 10 0.002 (2.41) 0.002 (2.40) 0.002 (1.93) 0.002 (2.43)
PRODUCT 0.050 (3.48) 0.038 (2.02) 0.070 (3.37) 0.041 (1.45)
PROCESS 0.073 (4.49) 0.049 (2.66) 0.109 (5.35) 0.076 (3.34)
BOTH 0.078 (4.70) 0.038 (1.76) 0.086 (3.99) 0.080 (2.95)
PROD RETURNS –0.030 (1.37) –0.031 (1.45) –0.035 (1.66) –0.030 (1.25)
PROC RETURNS –0.045 (1.26) –0.047 (1.35) –0.069 (1.95) –0.048 (1.31)
BOTH RETURNS –0.032 (1.24) –0.046 (1.74) –0.043 (1.66) –0.041 (1.49)
DEMPROD –0.009 (0.55) –0.009 (1.49)
DEMPROC –0.032 (2.17) –0.028 (1.90)
DEMBOTH –0.060 (4.15) –0.057 (4.07)
HOMOPROD 0.010 (0.60) 0.011 (0.66)
HOMOPROC 0.021 (1.42) 0.018 (1.28)
HOMOBOTH 0.034 (2.12) 0.030 (1.98)
PRODCONC –0.080 (1.84) 0 (0.00)
PROCCONC –0.137 (3.72) –0.070 (1.31)
BOTHCONC –0.097 (2.42) –0.095 (1.34)
Wald testa 23.05 (3) 6.49(3) (3) 37.32 (3) 24.12 (3)
Sample size 1,846 1,846 1,946 1,846
Notes: t statistics robust to heteroskedasticity. All regressions pass the hypothesis of joint significance of regressors using the Wald test.
a The Wald test is different in each specification: In column 1; it refers to demand variable; in column 2, it refers to product homogeneity; and in column
3; it refers to market competition.
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duce and sell standardized products; if they introduce prod-
uct and process innovations, these firms may obtain higher
innovation returns than do firms that differentiate their prod-
ucts. Hence, the marginal returns of innovation appear to be
higher in firms with standardized products, probably because
these firms have already differentiated their products and have
obtained higher incremental gains from past innovations.
Market concentration lowers innovation returns, especially for
process innovations. If market concentration is an inverse mea-
sure of market competition, then innovation returns, and pre-
sumably innovation activity, are positively associated with product
market competition. This result supports Arrow’s (1962) thesis
and is contrary to that of Schumpeter (1942): Firms in competi-
tive markets obtain a higher price from innovation because their
starting level of profits is low. This result has implications for
competition policy, for dynamic efficiency also appears to be
positively associated with product market competition.
Limitations of the Analysis
Several limitations of this study are worth noting. Although
the data cover a four-year period, a decade would have pro-
vided a larger and more diverse sample. The innovation in
this study was a yes–no binary variable, and more precise in-
formation could have been provided by obtaining the num-
ber of product or process innovations. A third shortcoming
results from our measure of rents, which did not include in-
formation about the firms’ human resource policies or work-
ers’ perceptions of their captured rents. These additions would
have provided richer results in the present study and serve as
suggestions for future research.
NOTES
1 This was done following the NACE-CLIO classification.
2 Geroski et al. (1993) present a similar specification except
that the dependent variable is the rate of return.
3 Each measure presents problems. The number of people in-
volved in R&D activities ignores resource flows from research
equipment and materials, whereas R&D expenditures include
purchases that do not confer significant technological advances
to the firm, that is, the expenditures on old equipment.
4 It is a typical F test with one degree of freedom in the nu-
merator corresponding to one restriction.
5 We were concerned about the possibility that industry con-
centration was endogenous, but a Hausman test (F = 0.00078)
allows us to reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity at any sig-
nificance level.
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